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TO THE PEOPLE 
OF 
ST. PHILIP'S AND ST. MICHAEL'S P ARISHES1 
F.ELLQW-CITIZENS: At the last session of the Legislature the debate on 
the Bank of the State was suppressed by the friends of the Bank, before they 
allowed me the opportunity to reply to them. As the Chairman of the Com-
mittee which reported the bill under consideration, and, m0reovcr, as Chair-
man of the Committee of Ways and Means, I was entitled to be heard in 
reply. This right was still more perfect, because I had been personally assailed 
by two champions of the Bank; and the South Carolina Legislature had 
never before refused to the humblest Representative an opportunity to defend 
himself. This result was brought about by a bare majority of two votes; 
and, when you are informed that the two champions who had assailed me per-
sonally voted in the majority, and that one of them actually harangued the 
House in favor of cutting off the debate, and with it my reply, you will 
agree with me that pursuit of such adversaries would be superfluous. I have 
no disposition to tear them from the horns of the altar. 
But the privilege of sanctuary is altogether personal; and, while I redeem 
the pledge which I made at the opening of the debate, (to decline all pers,mal 
controversy,) I cannot permit the friends of the Bank to shut me out from 
laying-before you, fellow-citizens, the information and .arguments which I had 
collected in reply. You are entitled to these; and I also, as your Repre-
sentative, am bound to justify to you the course which I have adopted. De-
nied, as I have been, the privilege of speaking as your Representative, I 
rejoice that I cannot be denied the privilege, which I now exercise, of appeal-
ing to you through the Press. 
You all' may remember, fellow-citizens, that at the session of 1848, Governor 
Johnson recommended to the Legislature a recharter of the Bank of the State. 
This recommendation brought up a long and able debate in both branches, 
which resulted in the adoption of the following resolutions: 
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i, I. Resolvtd, That it is Unwise and inexpedient for a State to engage in hanking, or to 
1ubject its resources to the casualties of banking institutions. 
"2. Reaolved, That the Bank of the State is founded on this erroneous policy, and 
exposes the public treasury and the public faith to the hazards incident to Banks. 
" Resolved, That it is inexpedient to recharter the Bank of the State; and-it is declared 
that this General Assembly does not regard such a declaration of opinion as calculated or 
intended to violate the faith of the State or the security of the foreign creditor." 
The first resolut.ion passed the House by a vote of 86 to 31, and the Senate 
by a vote of 34 to 9. 
The second resolution passed the House by a vote of 85 to 31, and the 
Senate by 30 to 13. 
The third re1olution passed the House by a vote of 66 to 48, and in the 
Senate by 20 to 17. 
These resolutions were adopted so late in the session, that no plan could be 
brought forward for consideration; and the matter remained over until the last 
t.1ession, when Governor Seabrook proposed a plan for putting the affairs of 
the Bank in a train of liquidation. '.l.'his plan was referred to a Joint Com-
mittee of both Houses, who reported a modification, of which the following 
outline presents the leading features : 
1. The Board of Directors was to be reduced to a President and four Di-
rectors, with a salary of $1,000 to each Direct.or-agencies to be substituted 
for the Branches, and a reduction to be made of officers and expenses. 
2. The chartered powers and privileges of the Bank were to be continued 
in all respects, except that no new loans of money should be made. 
3. Tile busines!I paper and bills of exchange, and the convertible property 
of the Bank, were to be applied to meet its engagements; and, on all other 
paper, an extension of time not exceeding ten years is given to all debtors 
who would give unexceptionable security to pay an annual interest of 7 per 
cent. on the whole debt, and at least one-tenth of the principal. 
3. All surplus money on hand was to be applied to pay the foreign debt of 
the State. 
To this plan, two preliminary objections were urged by the advocates of the 
Bank: 
1. It was said that the determination of the Legislature not to recharter the 
Bank did not call for any change in its plan of management. 
2. That even if it did, this was not the proper time for making such change. 
As to the first objection, the friends of the Bank have themselves found it 
eo untenable, that they have been reduced to the necessity of rearguing the 
question of recharter, and of going again over the ground decided at the ses· 
,ion of 1848. Nothing can be more obvious than that., if no change be made 
~ .. 
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in the plan of business of the Bank until the end of its charter, a recharter 
will then become absolutely necessary. An institution, with five millions of 
money transactions, in a small community like thid, could not be dealt with in 
a summary manner, without immense injury to the country. Seven years be-
fore its termination would be fully short for commencing the change, and the 
sooner preparation is made, the more gentle and impereeptible would be tbe 
shock of closing its affairs. 
The analogies of private business will furnish a safe rule of action. No 
man of ordinary prudence would fail to make due preparation, if notified that 
his death was at hand; and, even in a large copartnership concern, no man of 
prudence would conduct the business on the same extended scale, and in the 
same way, after a time had been fixed upon for closing the concern. The 
question as to the Bank is much stronger than that involved in these analo-
gies; for not only bas it been decided that the Bank i,1ball cease at the end of 
its charter, but that decision is founded on the fact that the Bank is unsound in 
principle and is injurious to the public welfare. There is, therefore, the strong-
est reason wby it should cease to exist, at the earliest possible period. 
The next preliminary objection taken is, that this is not the proper time for 
change; and the friends of the Bank point to tbe storm-cloud at W a.shington, 
and ask whether, at such a. time, it is not unwise to divide the State. 
When Arista was beaten on the p'.a.ins of Texas, the Mexicans inveighed 
against us that we had first made war on them by marching to the Rio Grande, 
and there were found Americans to re-echo the cry, until among Arista's 
papers were found the orders of the Mexican Government directing his ad-
vance, long before the American army entered the disputed territory. This 
Bank adopts the example of the Mexicans. It raises against us the cry of 
making war upon them; when, if they would look into their own documents, 
they would find that the war is all of their own making. Who brought up the 
question of recharter eight years before the expiration of the old charter? 
Their own friends, under the lead of Gov. Johnson. When this question was 
fully argued, and was decided against the Bank, who took a.n appeal, and re-
tained counsel to overturn the deci11ion of the Legislature? Nay, more: who 
has stirred up the foreign creditor, and brought forward from these foreigners a. 
protest of home manufacture? And who suggested the employment of foreign 
counsel, to bring into odium and disrepute abroad the proceedings of our own 
Legislature? The sequel will show. 
If the Bank were so considerate of the signs of the times, and sought, in 
good faith, to avoid division at home, was it not their duty to submit to the 
decision of the Legislature, fairly and deliberately expressed? If, instead of 
6 
stirring the matter anew, the President and Directors had simply done what 
every faithful agent is bound to do-carry into effect the declared will of his 
principal-would there now be any division in the State? Nay, if even now, 
instead of bearding the Legislature, and assuming the character of masters, 
they would simply execute the will of the people, as expressed by their Repre-
sentatives, all strife would cease, and the State would present a calm and united 
front. 
But the objection is, in itself, not only unsound in argument, but untrue in 
fact. In point of fact, the present time is, of all others, the very best at which 
a change of plan could be commenced. Even supposing that there is to be a 
conflict with the General Government, are we not better prepared for it with 
a Bank whose resources are dail_v coming in and none going out? The plan 
proposed by the Committee is precisely that which banks or individuals would 
take when preparing for an emergency. In every such case new loans would 
be cut off, and they would curtail, as much as possible, their indebtedness. 
The Bank of the State would be obliged to take this very course, if any re-
vulsion in commercial affairs should even now take place. Its cash liabilities 
exceed its cash assets by upwards of one million of dollars,,. and nothing but 
the credit of the State and the resources which she affords the Bank enables 
it to maintain itself, so widely extended as it is now. An attempt at further 
extension would be much more likely to involve the State in trouble, and to 
require a new issue of State bonds to aid the Bank, rather than afford aid to 
the State from the Bank. 
A still more satisfactory answer to this obje~tion is found in the present 
actual finaneial condition of the State. Our agricultural produets are bringing 
fair prices, and every elass of society is in a sound condition. The money 
market is easy everywhere, and I have heard factor after factor mention the 
unusual circumstance of balances remaining in their hands uncalled for by the 
planters. There is not the least difficulty, to men in good credit, in procuring 
any reasonable accommodation; and the whole country is in so prosperous a 
* The last annual statement of the Bank of the State shows tlie following condition of 
its cash liabilities and assets : 
Liabilities. 
Deposites 
Bank Notes in Circulation 
Assets. 
Soecie 
Bills of other Banks and amount due by them 
Exchange 
Excess unprotected • 
$182,842 
$666,430 
826,198 
$1,492,628 
74,6:14 
196,437---454,913 
$1,037,715 
'! 
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condition, that it would be difficult to find a more appropriate time for a change 
of plan. 
The first instalment of $176,328 of the public debt is payable in January, 
and has already been provided for; and the next, for a similar amount, is not 
due until January, 1852; and the balance of the Sinking Fund, now applicable 
to meet it, amounts to $443,938. No further debt becomes payable until 1858. 
Another reason, too, which makes the present time appropriate for com-
mencing our plan is, that every additional year allows us to distribute the pay-
ments by the debtors over a longer period, and thus to make the contraction 
of the Bank more easy and gradual. In a time of distress and short prices, 
the very proposal to begin this operation might produce panic, and thus render 
dangerous or impossi_ble any change of policy. So, too, in regard to the Bank 
itself. It would be hazardous, in a time of panir, to proclaim loudly the fact 
which we now can contemplate with calmness, to wit : the excess of its cash 
liabilities over its eash resources, already noticed. If, in a time of pecuniary 
pressure, it were whispered that the Bank could not pay, on demand, specie for 
all its bills or cash for all its deposites, it is obvious that there might soon be a. 
race among those most urgent, and this race must end in a run upon the Bank 
a.nd a probable suspension of specie payments. 
And, finally, in answer to this objection, I will repeat what I formerly brought 
to your view, that it will not be prudent to delay measures of preparation-
because, about the time this charter expires, six private Bank charters will also 
expire; and, from the struggles which the Bank of the State is now making, 
it may easily be conjectured whether she will not attempt to compel these 
Banks to choose between the fear of losing their own charters, or the hope of 
making common cause with themselves. 
I think, then, that these objections are not only fully answered, but that the 
reverse of them is shown to be true ; and it follows conclusively that the pre-
sent is the proper time to prepare the way for closing the business of the Bank. 
Having' disposed of these preliminary objections, I shall, in my next number, 
proceed to consider the plan submitted by the Joint Committee for conducting 
in future the business of the Bank. 
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NUMBER II. 
F.ELLOW-CITIZENS: In my last number, I endeavored to satisfy you tbat the 
decision of the Legislature that Bank and State should be separated, and the 
further determination that it was inexpedient to recharter the Bank of the 
State, involved, as a consequence, a change in the mode of conducting the 
Bank, and that the present was the proper time to commence that change. 
I come now to the r,ext inquiry, which naturally follows, to wit: What shall 
that change be ? What new plan is it proper to adopt for carrying out the 
determination of the Legislature ? 
The Joint Committee reported a plan, which, as has been already stated, 
embodied four great leading features. 
1. The first of these proposed to reduce the number of Directors to four, 
with a. salary of $1,000 to each, without any privilege of borrowing money; 
agencies were to be put in the place of the branches, and the general scale of 
officers and expenses was to be reduced. 
The reduction of the number of Directors here proposed depends upon the 
propriety of dispensing wit-h new loans of money. This point will hereafter 
be considered under the second head. Assuming its expediency for the pre-
sent, it is obvious that, if no new loans are to be made, the present cumbrous 
machinery of large Boards of Directors and Branches is wholly unnecessary. 
Four competent Directors at Charleston, with the President, assisied by good 
agents at Camden ancl Columbia, under bond and security, could efficiently 
and securely conduct all the affairs of the Bank. 
A President, with four salaried Directors, would in every way be a more 
responsible and efficient Board than that now in existence. Men who yield 
their services for nothing cannot be held to any strict responsibility, and do 
not feel the same obligation to give up their time and aitcntion to business as 
when they are paid. Our present Boards of Bank Directors unite the evils of 
both systems, without securing any of the advantages ; for. while w~ pay more 
than any salary would amouni to, we stand on no better footing than if we 
paid nothing. 
To be assured of this, we have only to inquire why it is that so many anx-
ious suitors besiege our doors. from year to year. seeking the post of Bank 
Direotor? The answer is given hy the fact which the following year discloses, 
namely: that the successful aspirant has obtained from the Bar.k an accom-
modation of some twenty or thirty thousand dollars, at least; and, if we look 
back to the history of these loans, we will find that the Bank has already lost 
the enormous sum of $473,558, of which the greater part is on account of 
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Directors. If the State bad actually given to each Director of the Mother 
Bank a Judge's salary, instead of allowing him to help himself in this way, 
she would have saved money by the operation; and she might now, if she 
had back the money lost, actually have a fund which she could invest, and from 
its interest alone pay the whole expense of the Bank upon the plan of manage-
m~nt proposed by the Committee. 
Another change which the plan of the Committee would also effect, would 
be a reduction of the liabilities of the Directors. The private report, made at 
the present session, exhibits the liabilities of the officers and Directors of the 
Bank as amounting, in the whole, to $1,091,116-that is to say, these gentle-
men have left for the rest of the State $31,344 of the whole actual capital of 
the Bank; and when to this fact is added another, brought out by the Investi-
gating Committee, that thirty individuals have out among them upwards of 
$700,000, it may easily be seen in whose hands is the PEoPLE's BANK! the 
PEOPLE' s MONEY !-and from what quarters come these mighty cries for the . 
continuance of so valuable a fiscal agent of the People!! ! * 
But again, fellow-citizens : The plan proposed by the Committee not only 
would relieve you of this incubus, but it would save a large amount in the 
actual expenses of the Bank. I told you last year that we, your Representa-
tives in the Legislature, would sometimes Rpend an entire day in considering 
about the reduction of some $500 on the Adjutant General or Superintend-
ent's salary, while this other legislature would quietly vote away thousands of 
your money, without your even hearing of it or knowing by whom it is done. 
The documents before us now show that the expenses incurred in managing 
the Bank last year amount to $40,916; of which salaries alone amounted to 
$32,071. This is all your money. Do you know who received it, or who 
voted it away? We, your Representatives, have been obliged to refuse ap-
* The following abstract of the Report made at the last session of the Legislature will 
exhibit this fact : 
Total indebtedness of officers and Directors of the Bank of the State at 
CHARLESTON: 
Officers 
- -
~ 
-
$266,262 
Directors 
- - -
410,538 
COLUMBIA: 
$676,800 
Officers 
- -
$90,225 
Directors 
- -
222,336 
$312,561 
CAMDEN: 
Officers 
- - -
$12,855 
Directors 88,900 
---
$101,755 
---
Total 
- -
$1,091,116 
10 
propriations in the People's Legislature for Broad River, for books for Frce-
Schools, for charitable institutions, such as the Roper Hospital, and for the 
slain at Mexico. Perhaps this other legislature, sitting in the Bank parlor, 
might have spared some of this $40,916, could the People's Representatives 
have had the adjustrr.ent of their accounts at the Treasury. 
Upon the plan recommended by the Committee, several of the officers at 
Charleston could be dispensed with, together with the two Presidents at Cam-
den and Columbia, and all the officers at the branches, with the exception of a 
single agent at each. The Committee estimate that, under their plan, the 
expenses would not exceed $20,000; and that there would, therefore, be a 
saving annually of from fifteen to twenty thousand dollars. It is, moreover, 
to be borne in mind, that although not charged as an expense, the interest on 
the money paid for banking houses is an annual loss to the State, and is just 
the same as though it were a current expense. The banking house at Charles-
ton cost upward,; of $40,000, and, consequently, sinks annually for the State 
a revenue of $2,800, which ought, in fact, to be charged against the expense 
account of the Bank. 
The amount which it is proposed to pay each Director, in the plan recom-
mended by the Committee, is $1,000; and it needs no comment to show that 
this sum would not be more than a just compeosation for the time of such men 
as would be required for this responsible duty. I therefore pass on to the 
next feature in the plan. 
2. It was next proposed that the chartered powers and privileges of the 
Bank should be continued in all respects the same, saving that no new loans 
of money should be made. • 
It will be perceived that no change is made in the existence of the Bank 
as a corporation, nor in its action as a Bank of issue and dPposite, nor in its 
fiscal agency for the Treasury, nor in its payment of the public debt. The 
cha.nge proposed is simply in its power to create new debts. The old debts, 
together with the entire management and control of all the assets, are left to 
the Bank undisturbed. Not a dollar is removed from its keeping. Even as 
a Bank of discount, its powers remain for all purposes of renewal or accept-
ance of other paper in liquidation. It would seem impossible to contrive a 
more gentle movement in the way of change. It was, in fact, so gentle, that, 
believing as I at first did that the President and Directors would respect the 
determination of the constituted authorities, and conform to the policy solemn-
ly determined on by the Legislature, I had the simplicity to expect that they 
would themselves adopt the plan, and make no controversy about it. 
,"I 
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The annual report of the President and Directors soon undeceived me. 
That document disclosed the fact that, in the very teeth of the resolutions of 
the Legislature, they not only had fallen back on the old ground, but actually 
insisted that they had iu fact been rechartered, by implication, until 1870-
fortitying themselves with the opinions of counsel to make good that position. 
That is to say, this Bank, which, in theory, is our servant and instrument, 
having been declared by its master to be an inexpedient and unwise institution, 
flies in his face, tells him that he bas no right to meddle with them, and takes 
his own money to retain counsel on the other side, and (as I shall presently 
show) stirs up the foreign broker of the Bank to come forward and endeavor 
to control our free action in the premises. 
Let us proceed, however, to examine upon what reasons opposition is made 
to this part of the change proposed. It is not pretended that the a~sets of 
the Bank are in any way diminished or removed. Neither is it affirmed that 
the fiscal agent, created by the State and subject to be sued, is about to be 
destroyed. Tho Bank is still to receive its whole income and profit.s, and to 
pay the interest o O the public debt. It continues in existence according to its 
charter; and the sole difference is, that, instead of calling in the money loaned 
to one debtor and lending it to another, she either leaves it in the same bands 
at a higher rate of interest, or she pays with it her own debts. 
But it is urged that, as we have speuifical'y pledged the profits of the 
Bank to the foreign cre,Iitor, we have no right to change its character or dimi-
nish its profits ; and that the change proposed by the Committee injuriously 
changes the character of the Bank and diminishes its profits. 
I think I may undertake to say, in ad\•ance, for the Committee, and I cer-
tainly will say for myself, that I would not withdraw from the foreign creditor 
one farthing of his security. Nay, much as I dc~ire to see our State relieved 
from this Bank, I would submit yet l ,nger to its evil influences, rather than 
have a breath of dishonor tarnish the faith of the State. I desire to deal with 
the matter with that honesty which belongs to fair and open dealing, and will 
not suffer the Bank to charge upon the Legislatllre, or those of us who vote 
against its recharter, any want of the most perfect good faith. 
But what will you say, fellow-citizens, to this wanton charge of the Bank, 
w4en I undertake to satisfy you, that, so far from our removing or impai,ing 
the security of the foreign creditor, the State has actually increased his secu. 
rity to more than four times the amount originally pledged to him, and now, 
from these funds, actually furnishes double the amount of money required to 
pay his annual interest? Surely you will say, if this be so, the objection 
made is idle and vain. 
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In the addr.css of Gen. McDuffie, published in London, wben he advertised 
for this loan, he stated that South Carolina then owed a public debt of $1,700,-
000, for all which the Bank then stood pledged. That against this debt there 
was a Sinking Fund on hand of $850,000; leaving the remaining $850,000 as a 
charge upon the Bank capital. This capital then amounted to $1,156,318 
Deduct - - - - - - 850,000 
And it left $306,318 
For the protection of the loan then taken up by General McDuffie. 
Since that date, we have paid off the whole debt mentioned by Gen. McDuf-
fie, with the exception of the 3 per centd. of the Revolution, amounting to 
$117,438, and valued at $72,810. 
The Sinking Fund, in October last, was - - - $620,267 
From which deduct the Railroad debt-payable 1850, $176,328 
" " " " " 1852, 176,328 
-- 352,656 
Balance 
To which add present Bank capital 
Amount now pledged 
Instead of original pledge 
267,610 
1, 122,450 
---
1,390,060 
306,318 
Increase of security • - - - $1,083,742 
Besides all this, consider where the money is which was borrowed from the 
foreign creditor. You know it was loaned out to rebuild our city, and that it 
is secured by bond and mortgage, guarantied by our City Corporation. $727,-
800 still remains in these securitie3, and the remaining $37~,200 of the mil-
lion borrowed abroad is in the bands of the Bank, loaned out on personal 
security, which we are told is perfectly safe. So that the foreign creditor has 
here a clear undoubted security of $2,39:l,060, to meet his debt of $975,555. 
Is it not absolutely preposterous, then, to speak of objection to the security 
on the part of the foreign creditor? I would be willing to leave the decision 
to the Barings themselves, after the whole case should have been submitted 
~~em. • 
The other branch of the objection, in relation to the profits of the Bank, is 
equally without foundation. It might have been dismissed by simply showing 
that, so long as the Bank received more profits annually than would pay the 
interest on the foreign debt, the creditor Lad no concern in the matter. The 
Bank has to pay the foreign creditors about $60,000 of interest annually. 
How does it affect their interest, whether the Bank make $90,000 or $100,-
000? In either event they are safe-more is received than they require; 
18 
ancl in no event coulcl the plan of managing the Bank proposed by the Com. 
mittee interfere with the certainty of their receiving their interest. 
But we deny that the profits of the Bank will be diminished, and we will 
not leave to the advocates of the Bank even this ledge to stand upon. It i11 
susceptible of easy demonstration, that the Bank will actually make more 
money annually, on the plan reported by the _Committee, than on the existing 
plan; and that, too, without incurring the risk of loss incident to the existing 
plan. 
According to the last annual statement of the Bank, the actual profit car~ 
ried to the Sinking Fund forlast year was $103,250; and this ii! not far from 
the average of the last six years, 
in the Hank: 
The State at present owns, of actual funds 
The-real capital 
Sillking Fund 
Less debt, paid in January, 1850 
$1,122,550 
620,266 
176,328 
-- 443,938 
This sum, if invested at, simple interest, without any com• 
plexity of machinery, would produce • 
Against last year's receipts 
Gain to the State 
1,566,483 
109,647 
103,250 
$6,397 
But the ~implest mode of ascertaining the difference between the two plans, 
is to take up the discount line of the Bank. This amounts to $2,666,263. 
An increase of 1 per cent. interest on this, as proposed by the Committee, 
would produce one of two results: either the debtors would pay up, and enable 
the State to settle with the foreign creditor, or $26,000 would be added to the 
profits of the Bank; and if to this be added the $20,000 of expense saved 
under the new plan, there is a gain of about $t6,000. 
If from this sum any reasonable amount be struck off, to cover any contin• 
gencies, salaries, or over estimates, still a large ·balance will remain in favor of 
the plan recommended by the Committee. It is plain, therefore, 'that the 
foreign creditor would suffer no diminution of his security, even if he had a 
right to require that the profits of the Bank ·should not be diminished. The 
Bank would make more money under the new arrangements of its affairs-
it would be relieved from banking ri!!ks, and the foreign creditor would have 
the option of receiving payment of his debt, or of leaving it invested upon 
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l!ecurities four times increased in value, and as safe as can be contrived by the 
greatest skill and integrity. 
Surely, then, this point may be considered as settled, and I may proceed in 
my next to the third feature. 
NUMBER ill. 
FEttow-CtTIZENS: I now invite your attention to the third leading propo• 
11ition embraced in the plan proposed by the Joint Committee, namely: That 
the business paper and the bills of exchange held by the Bank should be col-
lected, and, with the convertible property in its hands, should be applied to 
meet the engagements of the Bank and of the State, as they fell due; and 
that, on all other paper, an extension of time should be allowed, not exceeding 
ten years, to all debtors who should give unexceptionable security to pay, 
annually, an interest of 7 per cent. on the whole debt, and at least one-tenth 
of the principal. 
The distinction made between what is called business paper and the general 
renewable debt, is in conformity to the usual course of business. Such paper, 
together with the bills of exchange, are paid as they mature, and furnish in 
general ample means for the current demands upon a bank. Where no new 
loans arc made, this fund would be continually increasing, and would enable 
the Bank, in a time like the present, readily to meet claims as they came in. 
These claims would come from three sets of liabilities-the bills in circulation, 
the deposites, and the balances due other banks. 'l'he bills in circulation 
would, in the opinion of the Committee, present no difficulty at all. They 
would still be as valuable and in as good credit as ever; the faith of the State 
would still remain pledged to redeem them; they would still be receivable in 
payment of taxes, and would still be paid out for public dues. There would 
be no cause in operation to bring them home; and, if we bear in mind the fact 
that a large circulation, put out by the Railroad Company, even now remains 
current, in despite of the law, and of the fact that they arc actually payable 
in mouey nowhere, we may be relieved from all apprehension on this score. 
Then, as to the deposites : The public money would still remain deposited 
with the Bank. Public officers, masters in equity, assignees, and many private 
individuals, would still keep their funds on deposite in the Bank; and the only 
deposites which would speedily be removed would be those of men in active 
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business, who would withdraw to other banks, where new discounts could he 
afforded. By the last annual report of the Bank, the general deposites amount" 
ed to $666,430, and there was nothing due to other banks-the balances being 
in favor of the Bank of the State. It would be a large allowance to suppose 
that $400,000 of the deposites would be called for. To meet this, the Bank 
had in specie - - - - - • $183,842 
and, in Exchange - - - - - 196,437 
and, due by other banks - - - - - 7 4,634 
$454,913 
Since the date of the above statement, the balances with banks has shifted, 
and the Bank of the State, on the first of December last, owed banks upwards 
of $100,000; but the dcposites had dC'creased, and the specie and exchange 
had increased very considerably-so that there was no doubt of their ability 
to tncet this demand. 
So, too, when it is brought to view that the stocks held by the Bnnk-
amonnting to $325,723-could be converted, in case of need, it may safely be 
assumed that, with a money market easy as it is at present, and no panic to 
call home the bills of the Bank now in circulation, no danger was to be appre· 
bended as to the ability of the Bank to provide for current demands, under 
the plan recommended by the Committee. 
This result left it open to the Legislature to take whatever course might be 
deemed best as to the general creditors. There was no occasion for any sud· 
den call upon them; and the course was therefore adopted, which is always 
best in an agricultural community, to wit: a steady and gradual call for pay· 
ments. Some of the Committee would have preferred a shorter period; yet, 
as the Governor bad already named ten years, and as that term would proba· 
bly be consumed in the collection of many of the debts, the Committee as-
sumed that as the extreme point, leaving debtors free to make payments at an 
earlier period if they chose. But in all cases of extension the most unexcep-
tionable security was required-in default whereof, the debt was to be collected 
in due course of law. That this course was wise and considerate, no one has 
yet denied. 
4. This brings us to the remaining feature, which is the application of col-
lections to the payment of the foreign debt. It was not known how much sur· 
plus might be collected at the end of the year; but, inasmuch as the funds of 
the State were pledged to the foreign creditor, it was deemed right first to 
offer to apply that surplus to his debt. If he should refuse to receive payment, 
then the bill directed the Bank to apply to the next Legislature for further 
~ 
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directions, and, in the meantime, to lend out any money which might be on band 
upon the security of our own State stock; so as, if possible, to lose no interest 
in the interval. This was an abundant provision, both for the State and the 
foreign creditor. 
But, in order to allay every possible doubt i"u the mind of the creditor, one 
of the friends of the bill, both in the Senate and House of Representatives, 
moved a resolution directing the' Governor to employ an agent to treat with 
the foreign creditor, and ascertain the terms upon which the foreign debt could 
be transferred home. The bill provided the money, and this resolution provi-
ded for the person who should at once satisfy the foreign creditor of the good 
faith of the State. It placed the whole matter in a train of just and honora-
ble settlement. It adopted the very mode sugge~ted in the letter of Baring, 
Brothers & Co. : for they say, " The only mode which suggests itself to us of 
making the withdrawal of the guarantee of the Bank either politic or just, 
would be by employing any funds at the command of the State in the redemp-
tion of the bonds by purchase." If the frieuds of the Bank were sincere in 
their cry about the public faith, is it not obvious that this resolution offered 
the very measure for which they clamored? And yet, fellow-citizens, all of 
them, to a man, voted for its indefinite po5tponement, without even permitting 
a discussion upon its merits. 
Such, fellow-citizens, was the plan proposed for the action of the Legislature ; 
and may I not ask wbether;.i.f the Bank is ever to cease, a proposition more 
kind, more gentle, more equal, and more just to all concerned, could have 
been offered? The friends of the Bank were aware of this, and did not pre-
tend to meet us in fair argument upon the plan itself; but they fell back upon 
the quest.ion decided at the last session, and contended anew for a recharter 
of the Bank. I shall not trespass upon you by reviewing the arguments wbich 
have already been refuted in the debate of the last session. I simply propose 
to examine :rnch new propositions and facts as they have urged, with a view 
to reverse the decision made at the last session of the Legislature. 
These, as far as I can gather from the various speeches and statements of 
the Bank advocates, may be summed up under the two following heads : 
1. That the reports of the Investigating Committees, made since last ses-
11ion, have disclosed new facts, which prove that the decision then made was 
wrong; and 
2. That the appeal made to the Governor) by Messrs. Baring, Brothers & 
Co., shows that our action in regard to the Bank is considered by the foreign 
bondholders :H1 a breach of faith, and should not be persisted in. 
17 
1. As to the reports of the Investigating Committees-what are the new 
facts disclosed by them ? 
We insist that, so far from aiding the Bank, they have sustained the most 
important charges brought against it. Do they not affirm distinctly that the 
funds of the Bank are monopolized by a few individuals, and have been loaned 
with the most partial band? Can any thing be conceived more partial than that a 
State institution, with such a capital, should be nearly absorbed by individuals 
in a few districts of the State? *-or, that the Directors and officers should 
have among them more than one million of dollars? t-or, that thirty indi-
viduals should have among them $700,000 more? t-or, that not a single bond 
bas been taken in pursuance of the true spirit of the charter? IJ-or, that the 
greater part of the debts s~ould remain for years in the hands of the same 
individuals ? § And yet all these facts are distinctly asserted by the Com-
mittees! 'fhe history of the debt of the Nesbitt Manufacturing Company 
alone is sufficient to establish most of the allegations made against the Bank 
at the last session. Can anything prove more strongly tbe wisdom of the 
Constitution, which requires a Treasurer to go out of office once in four years, 
and have his accounts settled by bis successor? Here is a company so mi:x.ed 
up with the private affairs of the President of the Bank, and so entangled with 
the Bank itself, that it is impossible for the account to be settled without the 
aid of a third person. Could any other cause account for the Bank permitting 
its President and another individual to hold a large iron establishment and one 
hundred negroes, valued at upwards of $200,000, for eight months, without 
any account whatever of its returns, and discharging them upon a simple de-
claration that no profits had been made-the papers having been burnt? ,r 
* The Reports show the following sums borrowed : 
Charleston, 
Richland, 
Kershaw, 
Fairfield, 
Four districts have . . , , 
Being greatly more than the actual capital of the Bank. 
$883,778 
610,426 
286,370 
224,876 
$2,005,450 
t See statement published in note to first number, at page 9. 
t "The extent to which this abuse has been carried may be estimated from the fact that 
nearly $700,000 are in the hands of about 30 individuals, borrowed from the Bank in 
Charleston alone, and some of the same persons are also large debtors to the Branches." 
Report, p. 14. 
II " Indeed it may be safely asserted, that of all the Bonds held by the Bank, there is not 
one which conforms with the requisitions of the charter." Report, p. 13. 
9 " The practice of allowing discounted notes to be renewed in full has prevailed to too 
great an extent, insomuch that many notes have been continued for years wit.hout any con-
sidcrahle reduction of their amount." Report, p. 13. 
ir" The property was advertised for sale on the 10th and 11th Sept., 18,15, and on those 
days was offered, &c. The President of the Bank, who attended the sale, &e., mu<le the 
purchase for the Bank; but in order that the works might not stop, and yet not be carried 
2 
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But it is said that the Investigating Committee have _established that there 
were errors, or misrepresentations, made at the last session in the following 
;particulars : 
J.. As to the Suspended Debt. 
2. .As to the value of the Stocks held by the Bank. 
3 . .As to the Bills payable, issued in 1848, by.the Bank. 
1. As to the Suspended debt: .At the last session, in my speech on the 
Bank, I stated that, from the experience of banb, it might be expected tnat 
an amount equal to the Suspended Debt would be lost. By referring to that 
speech, it will be seen that I stated expressly, that, although much of this 
debt might be good, yet experience had proved that an equal amount of what 
is now considered good would probably turn out bad. In reply to all this, the 
statement of the Investigating Committee is now brought forward, showing 
that only a portion of this Suspended Debt is desperate, and only another part 
doubtful; and as nothing special is said of the remainder, the friends of the 
Bank infer that it is as good as the other assets of the Bank. If so, why is 
it suspended, or why put in suit? That very fact throws discredit upon it ; 
for few men are subjected to suit who have means to keep a debt afloat. 
Even direct expression of opinion by the Committee could weigh but little 
in a matter of this kind ; for we have not yet forgotten the service of plate 
which was voted to Nicholas Biddle for his excellent management of the United 
States Bank, under the sanction of an Investigating Committee, among whom 
was our own Drayton. Within the same year the Bank exploded. The fact 
is, no Committee, however honest, can arrive at the truth of these subjects; 
for, while the debtor is always ready to bring up friends to sustain bis credit, it 
is impossible to find men who will volunteer to impeach it. The only test is 
an attempt to call in the money . 
.A single view, however, will ahow to any reasonable inquirer, that the Bank 
must certainly lose to the full extent of what was estimated at the last session. 
The whole of her assets, when footed up, are about five millions of dollars; 
and the amount of loss estimated was about 6 per cent. on this sum. What 
on at the risk and expense of the Bank, directed the person who was put in charge of them 
to carry on the business in the name and on the responsibility of himself and Col. Wade 
Hampton. The Committee have no account of the operations of tiie establishment while 
matters remained in this condition. No account ofthcm was rendered to the Bank. J.B. 
Mintz who had charge of the works during that time, states that they made no profits and 
that he was barely able to keep them in operation on account of the scarcity of provi~ions1 
but that the particulars cannot be stated, because the accounts and memoranda have been 
since burnt." Report. p. 17. 
21st May, 1846, was the offer to purchase by Col. Elmore, in behalf of himself, Wade 
Hampton, and Mrs. R. A. Brown. Report, pp. 17, 18. 
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merchant would not compound, at that rate, for any assets belonging to a large 
concern? The mere incidental expense incurred in collecting the assets of a 
concern would consume a large portion of the estimated loss. 
2. Next, it is said that at the last session the loss upon the Stocks and 
Real Estate was over-estimated by those who opposed the Bank. I freely 
acknowledge that the Committees have shown that the losses upon one portion 
of the Stocks will probably be made good by the advance on another portion, 
taking the market prices as they stand at present. This would seem to furnish 
an additional reason for realizing them at once. As to the Real Estate, how-
ever, there may fairly remain a difference of opinion-there being no market 
price, and there would be large variations in the estimates of the same property 
made by different persons. The result, however, can have no material bearing 
on the main question. It merely removes one of the items of diminution to 
the assets. 
3. The next item which it is supposed that the Investigating Committee has 
proved to be erroneous, is in the charges brought against the Bank at the last 
session, in relation to the account of Bills Payable, issued by the Bank. 
This item has been ushered in with much cernmony in the speech of the 
Chairman of the House Committee, and he exhibited much satisfaction in be-
lieving that he had at last found a rent in my coat of mail. If the Bank had 
exhibited to him and the Committee the transaction brought before the Legis-
lature at the la.st session, and the Committee had reported that to be correct, 
the issue would have been joined between us. But, instead of that, the Bank 
puts the Committee on another track, and exhibits to them another transaction, 
perfectly legitimate in its character, having nothing in comrr..on with that to 
which I objected, saving that it was called by the same name, and leaves the 
Committee to suppose that both were the same; and, ·consequently, that bot~ 
were equally justifiable. Had the Bank exhibited the two transactions, the dif-
ference would have been seen; and, unfortunately for the Bank, the Committee, 
in pronouncing upon the transaction submitted to them, lays its finger upon 
the very point wherein I will show they differed, and makes that the test. 
As every body knows, banks frequently have money at their credit in other 
cities, and sell their bills drawn on the Banks where th€y have, or expect to 
have money. These bills are called Bills Payable, and, in the Bank of the 
State, are charged to that account. In the last season, the Bank had money 
in this way in New York, to upwards of $50,000, and drew bills upon its agent 
in New York, where it was collected, which they sold to a bank in the interior, 
at the usual rate of exchange, and charged to Bills Payable. This transac-
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tion they exhibited to the Investigating Committee, and that Committee very 
properly say that the bill was a legitimate transaction, and prove it as follows : 
" That this transaction did not partake in any degree of the character of a shift or expe-
dient, is apparent from the fact that the Bank had, at the time the bill was drawn, funds in 
New York to a much larger amount, and could, with perfect convenience, have drawn it 
payable at sight." 
Now, let us examine the transactions excepted to at the last session. The 
following is the Report of it, made at the time by the Committee of Ways and 
Means, and published by order of the House: 
"The Committee of Ways and Means, to whom was referred the Report of the Presi-
dent and Directors of the Bank of the State, respectfully report: 
"That they have felt it to be their duty to investigate the unusual item of bills payable, 
which appears to the debit of the Bank, and from the information received from the Presi-
dent and Cashier, they ascertain the following facts, which they deem it to be their duty 
to lay before the House : 
"That prior to 1st October last, the Bank was desirous of procuring a snpply of spec[e to 
meet anticipated liabilities upon its paper, and with this view, drew those drafts on New 
York on the Bank there which had acted as their Deposite Bank. These Drafts were 
part at 30 days and part at 60 days, and the acceptance of them was waived. From tho 
face of the 30 days' Draft, the Bank of the State allowed a deduction of 1 1-4 per cent., 
and from the face of the 60 day Bills a deduction of 1 3-4 per cent. The operation was 
with the Bank of Charleston, and the Bank of the State received from that Bank specie 
for the bills, less the discount above stated. 
"These Bills amounted to $140,000 on 1st October. Before they came to maturity the 
Bank of the State issued other Bills on New York, at 60 days, drawn in the same way. 
The Bank on whom the Bills arc drawn has no funds of the Bank of the State, and is not 
expected to accept, or under any obligations to accept, and the acceptance is waived at the 
time the Bills are issued. The Bank of the State expects to put them in funds by sending 
on and selling Sterling Exchange, which they buy in Charleston. The Bills now running 
amount to $228,000. These last were taken for the same purpose as the first, but at a larger 
discount. They are 60 day Bills from which 2 per cent. has been deducted, and $100,000 
of them were given in a transaction with the Bank of Hamburg. It is intended to pay 
C1em by sending on Sterling Exchange, and the reason assigned for allowing a heavier dis-
count from the last Bills is, that exchange on New York has fallen since the first were 
issued. The expiinse of putting down specie in Charleston is said by the Cashier to be 1-2 
per cent., and he expects to make by the sale of Sterling Exchange what is lost on the other 
operation. 
"The justification offered by the Bank for the operation is, that it was done to save a call 
upon the debtors of the Bank in these difficult times." 
Now, ap;,ly the test proposed by the Committee to determine "a shift or 
expedient," and the cbaraotcr of these bills is at once settled by themselves. 
The Bank of the State is called upon to pay demands in specie. It issues 
c 
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Bills of Exchange at 60 days on a bank in New York, when it neither had 
money nor had a right to draw; and, to prevent the awkwardness of having 
such a bill presented for acceptance, it makes an agreement with the creditor 
of the bill that it shall not be accepted-as the phrase is, acceptance waived, 
And what does it pay for this complaisaace of the creditor? " 2 per cent. for 
60 days!" Besides which, it must add t per 'cent. to get the money placed 
in New York, to meet the bill at the end of 60 days. 2f per cent. for 60 
days is six times that sum for a year, or 13} per cent.; and this is on transac-
tions ranging up to $228,000 J 
What was the object of the transaction? It cannot be pretended that it 
was a fair sale of the bills; for the market price for good bills at that time, 
on New York, wast per cent. for sight checks; and, consequently, 1 per cent. 
for 60 days-which is less than one-half of what was paid by the Bank. It is 
plain, therefore, that the Bauk was reduced to the necessity of paying usuri-
ous interest to stave off a demand for 60 days. The excuse made by the offi-
cers proves this conclusively: " The justifieation offered by the Bank for the 
operation is, that it was done to save a call upon the debtors of the Bank, 
in these difficult times." 
This item then is justly supposed to be "an indication that the Bank was in 
a weak and unsound condition, and had been forced to resort to shifts and 
expedients for the purpose of evading or postponing pressing demands on it." 
And the champion of the Bank, who expected to help its cause by charging me 
with misrepresentation, is welcome to the entertainment which bas been served 
up at their joint expense. 
This brings me to the next remaining point, to wit : The appeal of the 
}fessrs. Baring, Brothers & Co., which I will consider in my next. 
NUMBER IV. 
FELLOW· CITIZENS; I come now to consider the appeal presented to our 
Governor by Messrs. Baring, Brothers & Co., in behalf of the foreign bond-
holders, againet our right to interfere with the Bank. This documen~, 
asserts for the foreign creditor a right to require the State pf South Caro. 
lina to recharter the Bank of' the State for twelve years beyond its present 
22 
charter-whether the Legislature deem it for or against the public good. They 
assert that we have pledged to them the Bank; and although thej knew the 
charter was to expire in 1856, yet, as the Legislature could renew that char-
ter, they insist that the pledge of the old charter implied a promise to renew. 
This notion was first broached by the Bank itself, when assailed by Governor 
Hammond in 1843. Coming from that quarter, it was treated as a mere con-
trivance to eke out the Bank's own existence; and it was not met with even 
serious argument. Neither could the efforts then made by the Bank induce' 
the Barings, or any of their agents abroad, to assume that position. All that 
was then asserted was, that the Barings "rather feared (that is the expres-
sion) that an act of the Legislature for the liquidation and abolition of her-
Bank might have a contrary effect upon the minds of some of the bondholders; 
and that an opinion that the interest on the debt was jeopardized "would n.ot 
be altogether without some foundation." Mark their caution t Could any 
factor say less to an urgent employer? " Some of the bondholders might 
doubt," and that doubt "would not be altogether without some foundation." 
The Barings, at this date, had probably Hot forgotten the facts. When the 
loan was effected by Gen. McDuffie, the Bank of the State, in common with 
all our other banks, had suspended specie payments, and had been in a state 
of suspension for more . than a year. On the London Exchange the Bank 
stood dishonored, and had no credit at all. Since then, our courts have deci-
ded that their charters were forfeited by the suspension. The Barings were, 
therefore, judiciJus in declining any positive assertion as to the assistance given 
to the untarnished credit of South Carolina by a suspended bank. But six: 
years afterwards, a new correspondent comes forward for the concern, under 
the name of Mr. Bates. New light now breaks in. · The memory of the con-
cern, which, even in 1843, was dim and unreflective, becomes at once a polished 
mirror, so wonderfully powerful as to reflect across the Atlantic Ocean a Da-
guerrean copy of the picture painted at the Bank. 
It will be refreshing to you also, fellow-citizens, in these degenerate days. 
to know how peifectly disinterested an appdlant is this same Mr. Bates ; for 
neither he nor his concern owns a single one of the bonds for which be has so 
generously come forward! As far back as December, 1843, the Barings teU 
us that, "almost the whole amount of the bonds sold here have passed from 
our hands into the possession of numbers of individuals;" and, . if any have 
been since purchased, or are now held by them, it must be in character of bro-
kers, employed for the Bank itself and for its account. 
By what mighty influence has this anomaly in financial history been brought 
about? Is it really true that we are about perpetrating . such a breach of 
-
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morals, as to shock the consciences of our London brokers, and that they can-
not sleep in peace but by coming forward with a protest? Or, is this another 
of the contrivances of this ever-meddling Bank? Have the Parings been 
moved to come forward by a sense of duty and a real claim of right? Or, 
have they been persuaded to lend a helping hand to an urgent and profitable 
customer? I am sorry that the facts which I must now exhibit allow but one 
answer. They will prove, I fear, tbat the Bank has, in this instance, dealt 
with the name of justice, as, in the Fire Loan of 1838, she dealt with the sacred 
cause of charity. 
If the appeal of the Barings be entitled to any consideration, it must be 
because, in the first place, it is honestly put forth; and because, secondly, it 
is founded in justice. As to its justice, we have already said quite enough to· 
show that it has no foundation.' When this letter of the Barings was written, 
they had nothing before them but the one-sided suggestions of the Bank, urg· 
ing them into a certain line of argument upon a suppositious case. Had they 
been informed of the facts, which I have already shown, to wit : that the State 
had actually enlarged the fund pledged for the foreign debt, from $306,318 to 
$1,290,060; that the debt, besides having this fund pledged for its payment, 
was secured by bond, mortgage and personal security, guarantied by the city of 
Charleston; that the whole of these funds were set apart for their security, 
in the bands ot the Bank, and ,were to be called in and applied in the first in-
stance to pay this foreign debt, if the creditors would accept payment, and if 
not, that they were to be invested as might be agreed on-had they been in-
formed of all this, they would have seen that their appeal was without any 
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semblance of justice. In fact, we have their own authority for asserting that 
they never would have made it; for, in their own letter, they suggest the very 
course which we proposed to the Legislature in our bill. They say "if the 
substitution of some other equivalent security could be adopted, with their con· 
sent, these objections would cease to apply," &c. "The only mode which 
suggests itself to us of making the withdrawal of the guarantee of the Bank 
either politic or just, would he by employing any funds at the command of the 
State in the redemption of the bonds by purchase," &c. And Mr. Bates had 
already informed the Bank that " it is probable that the bonds will remain at 
3 or 4 per cent. below par; and, by remitting the sum you wish to employ in 
the purchase of bonds in each year to my firm, they can always sccurn the 
amount, if not at rates below par, certainly at par." It seems snperfluous, 
thererorc, to waste time in proving that the bill reported by the Committee, so 
far from infringing upon ju8tice or tarnishing the faith of the State, exactly 
.1 
24' 
fulfilled the conditions required by the self-constituted champion of the foreign 
creditor. 
There is, however, one short view of the matter which appears to me per-
fectly conclusive, as to this claim upon the justice of the State. The Fire · 
Loan Act of 1838 authorized the borrowing of two millions of dollars. One 
million was borrowed abroad on 5 per cent. bonds, with the guarantee of the 
Bank, and the remainder was borrowed at home on State 6 per cent. bonds, 
without the guarantee of the Bank. The bonds abroad, with tho Bank guar-
antee, are selling below par, in a country where the legal rate of interest is no 
higher than the bonds; the other bonds, without any guarantee, are selling at 
from 7 to 10 per cent. above par in our country, where the legal rate of interest 
is 1 per cent. higher than the bonds. This proves beyond a doubt that the 
guarantee of the Bank adds nothing to the marketable value of the Stock ; 
and that the faith of South Carolina gives as high a value to the bonds as 
could be had from the superadded guarantees of all her banks. 
So much for the claims of justice. But we say that neither is this docu-
ment or claim entitled to consideration, as a claim honestly put forth and 
maintained by our foreign creditors. Every one will perceive the difference 
between the spontaneous act of the creditor, claiming that the Bank should be 
continued for his security, and a claim urged by the Bank itself, insisting upon 
a right to a renewal of its charter. The ap~eal of the Barings, therefore, if 
it came from the Bank, would not be entitled to a moment's consideration; 
and it involves its whole merits to show that it originated with the Bank, and 
has merely passed through the form of coming before us, with the names of 
the London brokers of the Bank signed to it, instead of those of the President 
and Directors. 
This branch of my subject is pursued with real pain. I would gladly pass 
it by, if I could do so with justice to the country or to ourselves. I regret 
the necessity which demands it; but the charge made against us by the Bank, 
that we are advising the State to tamper with her faith, compels us to come for-
ward in mere self-defonce and vindicate ourselves. 
The first information which the public received as to this appeal of the Ba-
rings, was through the :Message of Governor Seabrook. His Excellency, 
believing it to be a genuine document, presenting an honest claim, frankly com-
municated it to the Legislature; and that body, with equal single mindedness, 
called for the original and bad it printed. Every one, upon reading it, natu-
rally inferred that it was the spontaneous act of a friendly creditor, who, taking 
honest but differing views of his rights, frankly submitted them to the State 
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authorities. No one could say that the Bank had any agency in the matter; 
for the President and Directors, in their annual report, had informed the Le-
gislature that "the correspondence had with Messrs. Baring, Brothers & Co., 
on the subject of this loan, &c., are herewith submitted for the consideration 
of the Legislature." Of course, the correspondence, as understood by plain 
men, of common sense, meant all the correspondence-especially all that was 
material; and as no letter appeared from the Bank suggesting any such docu-
ment, it could not justly be supposed that the Bank had anything to do with it. 
Yet, upon examining the letters published, it was difficult to conceive why Mr. 
Bates, (who conducted the correspondence on the part of Baring, Brothers & 
Co.,) should speak of a "representation to the Governor," as a thing under-
stood between him and the Bank, and yet nothing about it appear in any of 
the letters published by the Bank. On further examination, it appeared that 
two letters, referred to by date, had not been furnished by the Bank-and 
these were then called for by a resolution of tbe Legislature. To the surprise 
of every one, ihey turned out to be the most important of the whole corres-
pondence, as you will perceive in a few moments. 
You must bear in mind that in December, 1847, the Legislature directed the 
Bank to make arrangements with the foreign creditors for the extinguisbment of 
the bonds before they should become payable. The correspondence shows that it 
was not until the 22d March, 1849, that the Barings received the first direc-
tions from the Bank to execute the directions of the Legislature, given in 
December, 1847. A letter of the 15th January, 1849, from the President 
of the Bank to the Barings, communicated a letter written by him in February, 
1848, which was never sent, and also communicated (what, no doubt, is a key to 
the revived correspondence) the resolutions of the Legislature in Decem her, 
1848, determining not to recharter the Bank. The reply of the Barings of 
the 13th April is prompt. It distinctly claims that the Bank was originally 
one of the securities given for the loan, but, with equal distinctness, admits 
that the State might substitute an equivalent security. The words are: "\Ve 
could not be justified in abandoning a security, given solemnly by contract 
to the bondholders, unless an equivalent could be offered to, and accepted by, 
them." 
Not a word is said about a right to claim a recharter; and as to getting in 
the bonds, so far from its being regarded a hardship to pay them off, it is helcl 
as a prize in a lottery. The letter speaks of them as follows: 
"As to the question whether the bonds could be gradually redeemed and cancelled, itis, 
of course, cviclent that no compulsory payments could be forced on the bondholders ; but 
we think that, if remittances and orders were given to purchase gradually, an amount 
26 
might be collected under par, (unless, indeed, the publicity given to her intention to pay 
them off at par before 1858 should prevent such an operation;) and then a certain number 
might be drawn by lottery in Charleston, according to the amount of disposable funds, which 
should have the privilege of immediate reimbursement; and if, after advertisement here, 
[London,) that facility be not availed of, in a certain time, by the holders of the numbers 
drawn in lottery, then the amount might be used for the payment of others who might wish 
to receive it." 
Thu5 far, then, the creditors interpose no difficulty to the action of the State 
in dealing with the Bank. All they demand is, payment or an equivalent se-
curity; and this is precisely what the opponents of the Bank proposed to do, 
as will be seen by referring to the bill and resolution which they offered. 
The Barings continued to entertain the same views up to the 19th of June, 
184!:J. Mr. Bates, their corresponding partner, had not yet bad time to read 
the "printed book which you were so kind as to send me." He goes on, in 
bis letter to the President of the Bank, to say: " I find that it will be neces-
sary to read almost the whole of it, before I can fully understand the subject, 
so as to represent the case to the Governor. I shall embark to-morrow for 
Liverpool, On the passage, I shall read the book, and be fully prepared to 
make a proper representation to the Governor. In regard to your inquiry as 
to the possibility of making an arrangement for spreading the reimbursement 
of the Firn Loan Bonds, making a portion payable earlier, it appears to me 
that there will be no occasion to make any arrangement, as you can always buy 
a certain amount of the bonds in each year, to better advant:ige than you 
would get by any fresh arrangement. It is probable that the bonds will re-
main at 3 or 4 per cent. below par ; and, by remitting the sum yon wish to 
employ in the purchase of bonds in each year to my firm, they can always se-
cure the amount, if not at rates below par, certainly at par." 
This is the last letter in the correspoudence which appears before the appeal 
to the Governor, which bears rlatc August 17, 1849. Why has the appeal 
been made? And what does Mr. Bates mean, in his letter of the 19th of June, 
of making a representation to the Governor'! Is it that Lis sense of right could 
submit to injury no longer from the Legislature, and that he felt himself con-
strained to appeal to the Executive? And bow comes it that entirely new 
ground is taken in this appeal of t.lie 18th of August ? In that document, · 
the claim is for the first time by him asserted that the State "could no more 
allow the pledged agency of the Bank to expire, when its existence depended 
on the mere will of the State, than openly withdraw it." 
Thus the matter stood before the public, as an honest assertion of an un-
prompted claim on the part of the Barings. The Bank knew better; but 
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they did not choose to inform us, until the call of both branches of the Legis-
lature brought to light two letters from the President of the Bank to the cor-
responding partner of the Bai-ings. The first of these bears date 3d May, 
1849, and is an elaborate let.ter, advising the Barings how to deal with the 
action of our own Legislature. He recommends that the whole matter should 
be brought to the view of our Governor, " accompanied by a letter, stating 
that the action has caused anxiety-what would be the effect of the measure 
indicated, or of any equivalent character, to depreciate the bonds-and ex-
pressing your hope that no action of the State will be taken, which will impair 
confidence or the security of these bonds, without the consent of the holders." 
He further advises them to procure the opinicns of counsel, and recommends 
Mr. Petigru and Mr. Webster, and further says: "But both of these would 
leave your case incomplete without an opinion from some eminent English law-
yer, which would show the views entertained where the transaction was made, 
and where the character and credit of the State would be most affected." 
In the second letter brought forth by this call, and dated 5th May, 1849, 
the Pre~ident of the Bank writes to the same foreign agent, as follows : "The 
'true course, it appears to me, is the one I indicated heretofore. The case appears 
'to me to be one of plain obligation on the part of the State, and, if insisted 
'on by the other party in the contract, cannot be disregarded. It is very true, 
'as contended by some amongst us, that when you made that contract with 
'General McDuffie, you knew the charter of the Bank would expire in 1856-
, two years before the first, and twelve years before the last, repayment of the 
'loan. But it was also seen by the Fire Loan Act, that the Bank and its 
• profits are pledged until 1858 ; and you knew that those who made that 
'pledge were fully authorized to extend the charter, and make the security good 
'in form, as they offered it in substance, by extending its charter. And when 
' they authorized the offer, and Gen. McDuffie appeared as their agent in Lou-
' don, with the act in bis hand, and the commission of the State under its broad 
'seal, you were fully justified in making a contract, based on the understanding 
'and faith 'bf the State that the Bank would be continued, and it.s capital and 
' profits held solemnly bound for tbe loan until its final redemption in 1868. 
"Having full power and ability to make good all the Legislature offered in 
'the Fire Loan Act, and all that the agent of the State (Gen. McDuffie) bound 
'her for in the contract, there is no excuse for refusing to do so, if you insist 
'upon it. 
"That you may have all the documents which we have published before you, 
'and see in what manner this point bas been treated before our Legislature, I 
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'send you a copy of our Bank Compilation. The Fire Loan Act is at page 
'40, and Special Reports at pages 565-6 and 651." 
The letter of the Barings to the Governor !cars date London, 17th Au-
gust, 1849; and if any one will take the pains to compare it with these letters 
of the President, the one will be found to be a mere echo of the other*-tbe 
very words, occasionally, having been adopted; and the original of both of 
them may be found in the document prepared by the President of the Bank in 
1843, when Gov. Hammond assailed the Bank-to which document the Ba-
rings are specially referred in the Bank Compilation. 
After all this, will any one gravely set up this appeal as the act of the foreign 
bondholder ? Or, is it again to be read to our Legislature as a solemn lecture 
upon national faith, as understood in London? The contrivance is too thin to 
need further exposure. 
But there is a more serious aspect of the subject which must be presented. 
In the commencement of my remarks, I exhibited to you the resolutions adopt-
ed by our Legislature, declaring this Bank to be injurious to the public welfare, 
and that it was inexpedient to recharter it. Here was the solemn decision of 
the State itself. It became immediately the duty of every agent and officer of 
the Bank to carry into execution that decision. The constituted authorities 
had acted; and as well might a sheriff refuse to execute the sentence of a 
court, and retain counsel to prove that sentence unjust, as for the Bank to do 
the same with a solemn decisiou" of the Legislature. Extend the proposition, 
and see whither it leads. Suppose, in the foreign relations of our country, 
Congress h{d determined upon a negotiation with England or France-what 
position would that Secretary of State hold, who, instead of urging the claims 
made by his own country, should write to the foreigner, and advise him as to 
the best mode of defeating the action of Congress? And is not this precisely 
analogous to what the Bank has done'? The Legislature resolves that the 
public interests demand that the Bank shall not be rechartered-the Bank, 
thereupon, sets every engine at work to prevent that determination from being 
carried out, and advises foreigners to insist on contrary claims, to retain counsel 
to present them, and itself does the same thing.t If ar,ything could exhibit 
the truth of all the allegations we have made against the Bank, this fact would 
do so. I do not believe that the. officers of the Bank saw the matter in its 
proper point of view. They supposed themselves to be the masters, and the 
Legislature to be mere intermeddlers. They claim to be our trustees, invest-
ed with full power to manage our money matters. South Carolina bas made 
* Sec the Appendix at the end of this Pamphlet. 
t Sec the opinions printed with the Bank Report, 
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an assignment; and the Legislature can only take that residue of authority 
over these concerns which the Bank, our assignee or trustee, will band over to us. 
If this be our position, fellow-citizens, it is at least something to be aware 
of it. I have myself been witness for years to the great influence exercised by 
this power behind the throne, but I did not expect to sec it so completely in the 
ascendant, as to assume a right to contermand or counteract the solemn decis-
ions of the Legislature. 
I refrain from commenting on this point. I have developed the facts which 
were necessary to exhibit the true weight of this charge made upon us of want 
of good faith. And I think that I have conclusively established that, if the 
Bank had used one-half the industry in executing the directions of the Le-
gislature, as to the bonds, which she has put forth in suggesting to their holders 
imputations upon the faith of the State, this charge would never have been 
heard. It is very clear that it would not have come from the other side of the 
Atlantic. 
I shall trouble you no further, fellow-citizens, than with a summary of the 
whole argument. 
!\"UMBER V. 
FET,LOW-CITIZENS: I propose now to sum up the various matters which I 
have submitted to your consideration. 
I have endeavored to satisfy your judgments that the Bank of the State 
ought not to be rechartered, for the following reasons: 
1. Because it is an institution not consistent with the character of popular 
governments-inasmuch as it is so complex in its machinery and relations, that 
few can spare the time and attention necessary to understand them. 
2. Because it is unconstitutional, and can only be judiciously sustained. by 
the same evasion of the Constitution of the United States by which a Pro-
tective Tariff is sustained. 
3. Because its charter violates the spirit of our State Constitution in the 
following particulars : 
I. In that it confers on a body of thirteen men, sitting in secret, and bound 
to each other by an oath of secrcsy, the power to appropriate at pleasure the 
public money; when, by the Constitution of the State, no such appropriation 
can be made but by an act of the Legislature, which must be first read three 
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times in tlie Senate, and three times in the House of Representatives, on three 
successive days, before it can become a law; and, as a further security, the 
Constitution requires each House to keep a journal of its proceedings, and to 
record the yeas and nays for public information-while the proceedings of the 
Bank are performed secretly, and studiously concealed from the public eye. 
II. The State Constitution gives to the Legislature alone the power to tax 
the people, and guards this power with so much jealousy, as not even to permit 
the Senate to originate a tax bill; whereas the Bank Directors have power at 
any moment, by a mere order, issued in secret, to tax the people to the extent 
of millions, by contracting debts or issuing notes, which the people are bound 
to pay. 
III. Because the State Constitution requires the Treasurers of the people's 
Treasury to go out of office every four years, so that their accounts may be 
passed upon by a successor ; whereas the Bank officers, who hold ten times 
as much of the public money, and have in their hands all the treasure of the 
State, continue in office for a lifetime. 
IV. Because the State Constitution confines the legislative authority of 
South Carolina to the General Assembly alone; whereas the Board of Bank 
Directors, sitting in secret, have undertaken to exerciHe many of the most re• 
sponsible functions of the Legislature-such as subscribing to and patronizing 
railroad companies, banks, and manufacturing corporations, without any public 
discussion, and without its even being known to the public by whom, or for 
what reasons, these acts of the Bank Legislntnre have been passed. 
4. Because the State has, with an almost unanimous voice, repeatedly con-
demned the connection of Bank and State as unwise aud inexpedient, and as 
involving the public revenues in all the casualties of banking; and because the 
extension of this system to the borrowing of money npon the. public faith to 
lend out to individuals, by bank accommodation-as has been done by this 
Bank-is fraught with still more disastrous consequences to the public. 
5. Because the tendency of such a Bank is to mislead and swerve from 
their duty not only its own officers, but the public authorities themselves, by 
the influence it exerts over tbem ; and if the President of the Bank be a. poli-
tician, it gives a master to the State. 
6. Because the experience of the Bank of the United States, of the Ala-
bama and other State Banks, has ·proved all banking institutions, which are 
connected with governments, to be uniformly injurious to the public interests. 
7. Because the history of our own Bank is fraught with similar lessons. It 
has, on every occasion in which its interests or wishes are concerned, from the 
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Fire Loan down to the present time, swerved the State from her true policy, 
plunged her into debt, and involved her in complicated and embarrassing trans~ 
actions, with which she would otherwise have bad no connection. 
8. Because the power exercised by t}le Bank Directors, to issue bills and 
other obligations which the people are pledged to redeem, and the distribution 
of the money thus raised among the Bank Directors and their friends, is a par· 
tial system of favoritism, in which each citizen of the State is virtually con· 
verted into an endorser of the notes of·a favored few, whether~the citizen will 
or no. 
These reasons having clearly established that the Bank ought not to be re-
chartered, I proceeded to examine the objections urged by the friends of the 
Bank against any interference with it. 
I. First objection: The chief of these was, that the pledge of the funds of 
the State and of the profits of the Bank to the foreign creditor, under tho 
Fire Loan Act, stood in our way, 
To this it was answered, that we did not propose to remove any of the funds 
of the State from the obligation imposed upon them. They were to be pre-
served for the foreign creditor until bis debt should be paid. Whether the 
funds were in the hands of a bank or any other agent, they were equally the 
funds of the State, and equally secured to the foreign creditor his debt. 
II. It was answered that a pledge of the funds of the State did not prevent 
a change of investment, any more than when trust funds are invested for a pri· 
vate trust; otherwise all the substitutions of Railroad Stocks in the upper 
country, which the State has lately made for its South Carolina Railroad Bonds 
and Stock, were unlawful. 
III. It was answered that, as to the Bank itself, the creditor, when be 
loaned his money, had before him the Bauk charter, which, on its face, declared 
that the charter would expire i~ 1856; and he had, therefore, no right to 
count on its existence beyond that time. 
IV. It was answered that, so far as the profits were concerned, the cr:)ditor 
would be benefitted by discontinuing the Bank, inasmuch as the returns of the 
Bank itself showed, that during the last ten years the average profit on tha 
capital was less than 6 per cent. per annum; whereas the money, if merely 
loaned out, without any banking risk, would bring 7 per cent. 
Second objection: That this was a Bank for the accommodation of planters; 
and to destroy it would be injnrious to the agricultural community. 
This objection was answered by showing that the Officers and Directors of 
the Bank itself had among them $1,091,118-which left, of the actual capital 
of the Bank, only $31,344 for all the rest of the State. 
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That, so far as the borrowed capital was concerned, $727,000 of it was 
loaned in Charleston under the Fire Loan; and that, of the other money in the 
Bank, thirty individuals had out upwards of $700,000; that in Charleston, 
Columbia and Camden alone, near two millions were loaned; so that the plant. 
ers in the State at large would find no greater relative surpl!ls for their accom-
modation from the borrowed than from the real capital. '.!.'bat, in fact, the 
Bank was administered for the benefit of the Directors and a few favorites, 
and not for the planters. 
The argument having been advanced to this point and the objections an-
swered, it followed, as a matter of course, that the Bank's charter ought not 
to be renewed; and this brought up the inquiry, when should we commence 
measures of preparation? 
I maintained that it was necessary to begin now : 
1. Because, in a small community like ours, it would necessarily take many 
years to call in so large an amount of money as is employed by this Bank; 
and if we did not begin before the end of the charter, a renewal of it would 
be forced upon us by necessity. 
2. Because the sooner we begin, the more time could we take for distribu-
ting the payments to be made by the debtors. 
3. Because the country is now in so excellent a financial condition, that no 
danger was to be apprehended from commencing the change now. 
4. Because the analogies of private business established the wisdom and 
prudence of changing the mode of conducting any large concern, when a period 
was fixed upon for its termination. 
Objection: At this point, it was objected that our relations with the Gene-
ral Government rendered it unwise to interfere with the Bank, or to divide 
the State into parties. 
Reply : To this we replied, that extended as this Bank always has been-
with its assets beyond its control-in times of panic or difficulty it never could 
assist the State. It would be a source of weakness instead of strength, and 
would be more likely to need help from the State to sustain itself, rather than 
to afford any to the State; and so far as any measures of protection for such 
a crisis were to be taken, the best that could be advised were to call in the 
assets of the Bank, and place them in an available form, instead of leaving 
them at large as they now are. 
It was further replied, that whatever division existed in the State was the 
act of the Bank and its friends. They had attempted to get a recharter eight 
years in advance; and when the St:1te authorities hac1 decided against their 
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charter, instead of conforming themselves to that decision, they bad set 
every engine at work at home and abroad to counteract the decision of these 
authorities; and that the present division of the State, therefore, was of their 
own instigation. 
Having thus established that a change was proper, and that now is the time 
for commencing it, it remained to inquire, what should this change be? 
The plan which we propoeed embraced four leading features, set forth in a 
bill-and a fifth, embraced in a resolution; all of which were before the Le-
gislature· at the last session. 
1. The Board of Directors was reduced to a President and four Directors, 
with a salary of $1,000 to each Director, and no privilege to borrow;_ agen-
cies were substituted for the Branches, and officers and expenses reduced. 
2. The chartered powers and privileges of the Bank were continued in all re-
spects, except that no new loans of money were to be made. 
3. The business paper and bills of exchange, and the convertible property 
of the Bank, were to be applied to meet its engagements; and on all other 
paper an extension of time, not exceeding ten years, is given to all debtors 
who would give unexceptionable security to pay an annual intcrest·of 7 per 
cent. on the whole debt, and at least one-tenth of the principal. 
4. All surplus collections were to be applied to pay the foreign debt of 
the State. 
5. To these was added a proposition to employ an agent to treat with the 
foreign creditor, and see upon what terms his debt could be transferred home. 
These various details were shown to be reasonable and proper; and, in the 
expectation that the Bank would obey the solemn determination of the Legis. 
lature, they were supposed to be such as would be acceptable to the Bank 
itself. 
But, instead of that, the plan was met with open war ; and instead of the 
assault being made upon its reasonableness and expediency, the campaign was 
transferred back to the old ground, and the friends of the Bank recurred to 
the question of recharter, and. renewed the argument on that score. 
I did not think it necessary again to refute their arguments, but merely to 
take up the new matter which was brought forward since the decision against 
the recharter in 1848. 
This new matter classed itself under two heads : 
1. The facts reported by the Investigating Committees appointed in 1848, 
and-
2. An appeal made to the Governor by Messrs. Baring, Brothers & Co.1 
claiming a renewal of the charter as a matter of right. 
a 
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I. As to the Investigating Committees, I showed that, so far from their help-
ing the Bank, they had proved all the substantial charges made against it. 
II. They stated that the- money of the Bank was most unequally distribu· 
ted, and that four districts in the State had out two millions of dollars; that 
t:he funds had been monopolized by a few individnals, and chiefly by the officers 
and Directors. 
III. That not a single bond bad been taken by the Bank, according to 
the spirit of the charter. 
IV. That many of the debts bad continued for years without reduction, 
in the hands of the same individuals. 
V. That the accommodation is partial in its character-some being required 
to pay, and other notes lyiug over for years. 
VI. That a large debt, due by the Nesbitt Manufacturing Company, bas 
stood for many years without one cent of principal or interest paid; and that 
not even an account of the establishment was required of those in whose 
bands it had been placed, after the Bank had gratuitously pmchased it. 
VII. That tbe sum of $-!85,084 had been lost by bad debts to the Bank, 
which, it otherwise appeared, was chiefly occasioned by the Directors themselves. 
2. As to the suspended debt, which it was said the Committee had rnported 
favorably upon, it was answered that we never denied that much of it wouf:l 
probably be collected; but we affirmed that experience bad proved that, in 
·such concerns, an equal amount would be found amongst the debts now cur-
rent to go to the suspended debt; and that the whole estimate of loss on this 
score, made by us, was not more than 6 per cent. on the whole assets of the 
.Bank ; a sum which we conceived would certainly be consumed in expenses 
~nd losses. 
3. The next particular in which it was contended the Committee bad exhi-
bited new light, was as to the stocks hdd by the Bank. We admitted that 
they showed that, at the present prices, the losses which we expected on one 
set of stocks would be made up by_gaios on others; but we contended that 
this afforded one of the strongest reasons why the Bank should realize on them 
at once. 
4. It was urged by the friends of the Bank that the Investigating Commit-
tees had proved us to be in error, in 1848, in charging the Bank with re-
sorting to shifts to raise money by issuing bills payable. 
In reply, I showed that the transaction reported upon by the Investiga-
ting Committee was a bona fide sale by the Bank of :Northern Exchange; 
whereas those to which I excepted were cases where the Bank, to raise spe-
cie or stave off demands which they were not prepared to meet, drew Lills upon 
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a bank where it bad no funds, paying double the usual rates of interest; and 
that, when these bills became due, they renewed them by again drawing where 
they bad no money, and again submitting to a usurious rate of interest; and 
that the excuse which was offered by them for the transaction, was an admis-
sion of their weakness in any time of trial. All which, I insisted, proved 
the weakness of the Bank or of its debtors, and established the charge made. 
The only remaining new matter urged was the appeal to the Governor, made 
by Baring, Brothers & Co., claiming a right to have the Bank rechartered. 
This appeal was proved to be a contrivance of the Bank, whereby they had 
induced the foreign brokers to father their own suggestions, for the purpose of 
saving their charter. It was made to appear that tbe Barings never had the 
least idea of taking the ground now ,taken until after the Bank had urged it 
upon them, sent them the materials, and even put the very argument in their 
mouths ; that all this took place after the Legislature bad expressly directed 
the Bank to make arrangements for an earlier adjustment of these bonds, and 
after it bad beca solemnly decided by the constituted authorities of the State 
that a continuance of the Bank was injurious to t'he public welfare. 
As to the matter of the appeal, it was shown that there was no foundation 
for any imputation on the faith of the State. 
1. Because it was a mere afterthought to say that the Bank had helped the 
credit of the State in procuring this loan, inasmuch as the Bank had suspend-
ed specie payments at the time it was contracted, and had stood dishonored 
for upwards of a year before on the London Exchange; that the loan itself 
was contrived to help the Bank, and but for the money over which it gave the 
Bank command, could not have resumed specie payments. 
2. Because the guarantee endorsed on these bonds by the Bank was a ·per-
fectly gratuitous act, not re,1uired or authorized by the law, and must have 
been done for some such purpose as that for which it is now used. 
3. Because, since the loan, the State has increased the funds pledged as :t 
security to nearly five times the amount -Originally pledged; and that, besides 
this, the amount borrowed is itself secured, most of it on mortgages guaran-
tied by the city of Charleston. 
4. Because the plan submitted proposes to the foreign creditor, either to pay 
off his debt, or to do the very thing he himself proposes-substitute an ample 
equivalent security to that which he has. 
5. Because the price which our State Stocks maintain, without any guarantee 
of the Bank, shows that the holders of those stocks guarantied by the Bank 
could a! easily realize every dollar due to them, without the guarantee of the 
Bank as with it, and would suffer no kind of injury from its withdrawal. 
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6. Because the charter of the Bank was before the creditors, and they knew 
aa well as we do when it would expire, if they considered it of any value; 
and that the whole of this clamor about good faith is a mere afterthought, 
suggested and repeated by the Bank itself. 
I have thus, fellow-citizens, laid before you the whole subject. You will 
perceive that, although it covers so much ground, it all bears upon a single 
issue, to wit: The separation of Bank and State; the same issue which was 
fought with the United States Bank, the Pet Banks, and the Government 
Banks in other States in this Union. The issue is now before the people; and 
you are to determine whether, in South Carolina, you will etill maintain that 
the public faith and the public funds shall be separated from the casualties of 
banking. As your Representative, I have been contending for this principle 
for years, and you have continued to honor- me with your approbation. The 
experience of fourteen years of service in the Legislature has convinced me 
most thoroughly, that the Bank of the State is an institution dangerous and 
injurious to the public interests. A very large majority of the last Legisla-
ture has expressed the same opinion, and but for the powerful influence which 
this Bank exerts, would have embodied that opinion in the form of law. 
Our agency, fellow-citizens, as your RepnesentativeR, is now to be accounted 
for, and you are to determine whether we have been faithful servants. In pass-
ing judgment, permit me to war9 you, that false issues will be offered to mis-
lead you. Some of us will be ~ccused of seeking per&onal ends, or of having 
our own interests to subserve. So far as I am concerned, I am content, fellow-
citizens, to leave my character in your hands. I have no fears on that score. 
Others will accuse us of hostility to all banks. Believe them not, fellow-
citizens. The simple issue which we make is with a GOVERNMENT BANK. We 
say that it is unwise and inexpedient to subject the public moneys and the 
public faith to the casualties of banking. As for private moneys and individ,., 
ual capital, these may as legitimately be employed in banking as in commerce 
and manufactures ; and it would be as absurd to refuse to charter banks as to 
refuse to charter manufacturing or insurance companies. All these companies 
should of course be regulated by law; and, with banks in particular, measures 
should be taken to restrain their circulation within proper bounds. But, as 
regards the State itself, I can see no reason why she should not as well under-
take to buy and sell cotton, as to buy and sell bills of exchange, or engage in 
other banking operations. 
In conclusion, fcllow-.citizens, permit me to add, that I have delivered my 
coulloScl with an honest conviction of its being to the mterest of the community 
" to which we all belong. To that community, under Providence, I owe every 
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blessing I enjoy, and 'in its service I am willing to spend every energy I pos-
sess. So long, therefore, as you see fit to entrust me with your public inte-
rests, I shall most cordially strive to promote them to my utmost ability. And 
if, at any time, I should be so unfortunate as not to gain your approbation for 
the views which I may entertain, I shall still endeavor to do what I can for 
your good in any humbler sphere to which Providence may assign me. 
:Respectfully, your fellow-citizen, 
C. G. MEMM.JNGER. 
-

APPENDIX. 
A BILL to provide for the approaching termination of the Charter of the Bank 
of the State. 
Whereas the General Assembly hath determined that it i.s inexpedient to 
renew the charter of the Bank of tho State of Soul h Carolina: And whereas 
such determination renders it wise and prudent that the affairs of the Bank 
should be placed in a state of prepara~ion for the approaching end of its exist-
ence: 
SEC. 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives, now 
met and sitting in General Assembly, That instead of the present number of 
Presidents and Directors of the said Bank and its branches, there shall be 
eli:w.ted by the General Assembly, as heretofore, one President and four Direct-
ors, who shall go into office at the expiration of the present term of the Presi-
dent and Directors of the Bank at Charleston; and the President shall receive 
the same salary as heretofore ; and eacL of tho Directors shall receive a salary 
from the Bank of one thousand dollars. 
SEC. 2. The new Board of Directors shall order and conduct the business 
and affairs of the Bank as heretofore, excepting that they shall make no new 
loans of money; they shall reduce accordingly the number of salaried officers 
at the Bank and its branches; and may substitute an agent, one or more, in 
place of the branches, taking caro to require ample security wherever funds are 
entrusted ; and giving such notice as they may think reasonable to such offi-
cers us may be dispensed with, to enable thorn to find other employments. 
SEC. 3. The Board of Directors shall collect the business paper, together 
with all billil of exchange, and they shall apply the same, together with the 
casl1 assets, stocks, and other convertible property of the Bank, to meet the 
engagements of the Bank and of the State, as they may accrue; and as to all 
other debts due to the Bank, the board are authorized to extend the time of 
payment to any debtor desiring it., to a term of years not exceeding ten; pro-
vided ample security be taken for the payment of the debt and legal interest, 
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(the interest annually,) and the princiral by not less tl1an equal instalments, 
in each year of such extended term ; and in case such security be not given, 
the debt shall forthwith be collected in due cours~ of law. 
SEc. 4. The Board of Directors shall apply any funds which may remain in 
their bands to the purchase and extinguishment of the foreign debt of the 
State, whenever the same may be had at or under par; and if the same cannot 
be bad, theu they shall invest the said funds, for the time, upon the security 
of stocks of this State, and shall apply to the General Assembly for further 
directions in the premises. 
In the House uf Representatives, Friday, Deceml,er 7, 1849. 
Mr. B. F. Perry submitted the following resolution, which was read, and 
made the special order for this day, at 1 o'clock p. m. 
"Resolved, That the Governor be requested to employ an agent to treat 
with the foreign creditors of the State, and ascertain upon what terms the 
foreign debt can be transferred home." 
In the Senate, Friday, December 7, 1849. 
Mr. B. G. Allston offered the following resolution, which was made the 
special order of the day for 2 o'clock p. m. this day, to be considered in con-
nect.ion with the other propositions relating to the Bank of the State and the 
public debt, to wit : 
"Resolved, That the Governor be requested to employ an agent to treat 
with the foreign creditors of the State, and ascertain upon what terms the 
foreign debt can be transferred home." 
Letter from Baring, Brothers .S- Co., to the Governor, in relation tu the 
Fire Loan Bonds. 
Srn: Your Excellency's knowledge of the history of the public debt of 
South Carolina will have brought before your notice our connection with the 
Loan contracted in 1838 for the rebuilding of Charleston. At that time we 
took ourselves, and induced our friends and those who had confidence in our 
opinion to take, a large interest in that loan, and in times when the credit of 
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some of the States was depreciated we always felt and stated that implicit re-
liance might be placed in the security of this Joan and the maintenance by the 
State of South Carolina of all its engagements. We therefore stand connected, 
both in feeling and in interest, with the credit of the State, and venture, ;ith-
out fear of being misunderstood, to address your Excellency on the subject of 
some propositions which have been suggested to terminate the existence of the 
Bank of South Carolina, and thus withdraw that portion of the security of 
the loan which rests on the responsibility of that Bank. It would be pre· 
sumptuous in us, and far from our intention, to attempt any interfetence with 
the proceedings or policy of the citizens of your State in reference to any mat• 
ter of domestic legislation. Our only purpose is from a sense of duty to call 
the attention of your Excellency as to whether the discontinuance of this Bank 
is in accordance with the conditions of the contract of the loan of 1838, and 
therefore in harmony with the acknowledged feelings of honor which always 
distinguish the people of South Carolina. 
The loan to which we refer was contracted in London, as your Excellency 
is aware, by the Hon. George McDuffie. He was commissioned for this pur· 
pose under the great seal of South Carolina. We need not say to you that 
confidence in the statements of such a man, accredited under such auspices, 
was most effective. His statements were a satisfactory basis of negotiation. 
The representations of Mr. McDuffie consisted in an address signed by him, 
and in copies of the Act of the LegiEhturc and of the commission from your 
State. They were all printed and circulated, and were the documents on which 
the loan rested. They are included in a compilation of documents in relation 
to the Bank, printed at Columbia in 1848, and we earnestly beg an attentive 
perusal of them. 
It will be seen by these documents that the securities to which the takers 
of the loan were invited to trust were three : 
First, The faith of the State solemnly pledged; 
Secorully, The guarantee of the Bank, as a fiscal agent with a considerable 
capital and promising business, for the punctual payment of the interest and 
principal; and 
Thirdly, A specific pledge of the profits which should be derived from the 
operations of the Bank, to meet the yearly interest. This was in addition to 
the general liability of all the assets of the Bank under its guaranty. 
Your Excellency will not fail to notice that the State, ofits own accord and 
with frankness and a high sense of integrity which was appreciated, offered, 
in addition to the general pledge of its honor, the other securities as valuable 
and available. The State knew that as a sovereign it could be subject to no 
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coercion, and therefore it offered its subject, its own creation, the Bank, as a 
eecurity; and this security not only to insure the ultimate payment of the debt, 
but also the intermediate punctual payment of the interest. This se.curity 
was one whose profitable labors were also to render the payment of both inte· 
rest and pri11cipal easy and convenient alike to the creditor and the State. It 
was a security whose position would allow the tribunals of the country to ope-
rate on it by coercion. No greater evidence could be given of the purpose to 
make the security for the loan satisfactory even to the most distrustful. It is 
impossible to read these documents without seeing both the determined inte-
grity of the State in the charncter of these pledges, and the effect of them in 
procuring the loan ; and wc feel quite assured that there does not exist on the 
part of the authorities, or of any portion of the population of South Carolina, 
a serious intention to withdraw any one of the above securities, or disappoint 
the expectations of those who have evinced implicit confidence in their perma-
nence, until the extinction of the debt for which they were pledged. 
It is unnecessary here to allude to the extent of aid which the agency of 
the Bank bas actually afforded ; but it may be allowable to notice that it has 
yearly furnished to the State more than the whole inter(st on the loan of 
1838. 
We must, however, beg your Excellency to remark, that no intimation was 
given at the time of the loan in any quarter, nor until lately, that the Bank 
was not to perform its service for all the period of the credit which it was to 
secure. No such intimation was made by Mr. McDuffie in his proposals; no-
thing of this kind appeared in the Act of the Legislature or commis$ion of 
the State exhibited by him. The advantages offered were the agency of the 
Bank, its profitable business as a Bank, not for a part of the time, but for the 
period of the loan, as a whole. If it had been asked whether the charter of 
the Bank was not limited in time, it would have been instantly replied, that the 
continuance of the charter was wholly in the power of the State which offered 
the Bank as its guaranty; that the State which held out the Bank as a secu-
rity for the loan and interest, the whole loan and the whole interest, without 
reserve, condition, or limitation of time, could no more fail to continue the 
Bank by a new act of legislation than to provide for ultimate payment by pass-
ing, if necessary, laws for taxation It could no more allow the pledged agency 
of the Bank to expire, when its existence depended on the mere will of the 
State, than openly withdraw it. No act of legislation can be compelled; but 
compulsion was not in any way looked for in the conduct of the State, and 
what was relied on was the good faith and honor of an independent and sove-
reign Republic. ' 
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We beg, therefore, respectfully to submit to your Excellency the considera-
tion, whether the continuance of the Bank, with substantially the same powers 
and advantages as made it originally a desirable guarantee, is not required by 
public faith; and we feel that we should falsely estimate your sentiments, and 
those of the people over whom your Excellency presides, if we were not con-
vinced that that consideration will be paramount over all other views of domes-
tic or. temporary policy. 
If the consent of the holders of the bonds to the extinction of the Bank 
guarantee could be obtained, or if the substitution of some other equivalent 
security could be adopted with their consent, these objections would cease to 
apply; but the number of them, their various circumstances, the inexpediency 
of a public call for them to meet for deliberation, the impossibility of such 
meeting, and the appearance of coercion which the call of" a meeting for such 
a purpose would present, forbid the expectation of any such general consent; 
and the only mode which suggests itself to us of making the withdrawal of 
the guarantee of the Bauk either politic or just, would be by employing any 
funds at the command of the State in the redemption of the bonds by pur-
chase, and thus extinguishing the debt for which the agency of the Bank was 
one of the acknowledged securities. 
In asking from your Excellency the favorable consideration of our views on 
this subject, we are sure you will not doubt our respect for yourself, and for 
the community over which you preside, and we beg you to believe us, with sin-
cere esteem, 
Sir, your Excellency's obedient seuants, 
BARING, BROTHERS & CO. 
LONDON, August 17, 1849. 
Extract from the Annual Report of the President and Directors of the Bank 
of the State, made at the Session of 1849. 
"Thest1 opinions, also the correspondence had with Messrs. Baring, Bro-
thers & Co., on tho subject of this Loan, with a letter to, and the answers 
of, Gen. McDuffie in regard to the construction put on bis contract by himself 
and the house of Baring, Brotners & Co., are herewith submitted for the con-
sideration of the Legislature." 
The following letters were not submitted to the Legislature with the corres-
pondence, but having been referred to by d<tte in the other letters, they were 
called for b-y a resolution of the Legislature, and were then oommunicated. 
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President of the Bank to Barings. 
JosnuA BATES, Esq. 
CHARLESTON, 3d May, 1849. 
Sm : In my letter of yesterday, I omitted purposely any reply to that part 
of the letter of Messrs. Baring, Brothers & Co. in which they ask me to give 
you my views and advice as to wLat I understand to refer to the course that 
should be adopted on y(1ur side, in regard to the threatened withdrawal of the 
Bank as a security for these bonds. I omitted it because, pertaining to your 
·course in another aspect of the business, it did not belong necessarily to the 
negotiation which is our object, and I, therefore, preferred it should be kept 
separate; and this course is the more advisable in consequence of the hostility 
existing in regard to the Bank, and which would look on any suggestions from 
me to you, in regard to your course on the subject, with a feeling that would 
do injury to your interests. 
Messrs. Baring, Brothers & Co. attach much value to the sC\curity of the 
Bank on these bonds; and of course that the Bank shall continue in its pre-
sent shape, with a charter, until the debt is repaid or redeemed. They ask 
me to give you my views and advice, which I understand to refer to those mea-
sures which you should adopt to prevent the security being impaired or with--
drawn. 
I have seen no reasons to change my opinions in my letter of 15th January 
last; and I give it as my opinion that the whole matter should be brought to 
the view of our Governor, Whitemarsh B. Seabrook, that he might bring it be-
fore the Legislature and tbe public. While I see no reasons to change my 
opinions, there are one or two suggestions, in case you adopt this course, I 
would make, as to the manner of its acc0mplisbment. Our people are right 
minded, and are honestly disposnd to fulfil every engagement of the State with 
fidelity and to its letter. If well inf,Jrmed as to their obligations and duty, 
they are not easily led astray; but they are jealous of everything that looks 
like foreign interference or influence; and there are those amongst u~, who 
have talent and ambition, and who have staked themselves on the issue against 
you and the Bank; and they will not fail to lay hold of every thing that may 
enlist reason or prejudice in their warfare. 
In preparing any proceeding for our Governor, you should bear this in mind, 
and avoid every thing that would involve more than is necessary to your case; 
but you should not weaken your case for this; indeed, any other than a frank 
course might, as it might suggest the idea that you omitted to favor us. Our 
Governor is a hio-h.mindcd and honorable man, sensit,ive to everything that 
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would tarnish the character of the State, and at the same time is jealous of 
any appearance of foreign interference or influence. 
My idea of the course is this: A clear statement of the case,. embracing the 
negotiation, the Act of our Legislature, and the agreement, should be submit-
ted to at least two of the most eminent lawyers of our respective countries, 
one in each, for their opinions on the character of the transaction, the scope 
and bearing of the Ar.t, (June, 1838,) and the obligation of that contract. 
These, when obtained, should be respectfully submitted to our Governor, ac-
companied by a letter, stating that the action has caused anxiety, what would 
be the effect of the measures indicated, or of any of equivalent character, to 
depreciate the bonds, and expressing your hope that no action of the State 
will he taken which will impair confidence, or the security of these bonds, with-
out the consent of the holders. 
In regard to the counsel whose opinions would be most relied on, I·would 
suggest the Ilon. James L. Petigru, of Charleston, for the one in the United 
States, whose opinion would be the most influential. Ile was, for many years, 
Attorney General, and stands, without dispute, at the head of the bar of the 
State-is eminent for legal knowledge and integrity, and enjoys a higher (le-
gal) confidence in South Carolina than any other man I could designate. If 
you should propose another American, and desire l\1r. Webster, his opinion 
would doubtless carry more weight than any lawyer's out of our State. 
But both of these would leave your case incomplete, without an opinion from 
some eminent English lawyer, which would show the views entertained where 
the transaction was made, and where the character and credit of the State 
would be most affected. 
Unless some such course as this is adopted to inform the public of the true 
state of the case, the probabilities are not weak or remote, that the construc-
tion of the contract, as you undcrsta11d and insist on it, and as you consider 
important to the value of the bonds, (letter of 13th April last,) will be con-
strued away and disregarded. 
Those who oppose the recharter of the Bank say that there is no obligation 
to recharter it, because : 
1st. You had the charter before you when you took the loan, and saw that 
it expired in 1856; and although they admit that we, a party, have it in our 
power to continue the Bank until the bonds are paid, that we did not stipulate 
to do so. 
2d. That even if such is the contract, the Legislature of 1838 had no 
power or right to bind its successors. 
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3d. That all the Legislature pledged were the "funds" of the Bank, and 
if these arc still preserved for you, you have no right to complain. 
And 4th. That the State is good for the money, and does not intend to fail 
in paying. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
F. H. ELMORE. 
President of the Bank to Barings. 
JomuA BATES, Esq. 
BANK OF THE STATE OF SOOTH CAROLINA, 
Charleston, May 5, 1849. 
Srn: There is one observation in the letter of Messrs. Ba1'ing, Brothers & 
Do., of the 13th April, which it may not be amiss to discuss Speaking of the 
value put on the security of the Bank to the Fire Loan Bonds, while they 
entertain no distrust of the will ar ability of the State to pay, they add, "We 
could not be justified in abandoning a security given solemnly by contract to 
the bondholders, unless an equivalent could be oH:ered to and accepted by 
them-we should feel it a duty to offer every opposition which the laws of the 
State or the constitution of the Federal Government permit, to the sacrifice 
of such a security for the bonds now in circulatio11." The security is the Bank, 
and if it is not rechartered, that expires with the charter in 1856, two years 
before the first, and twelve years before the last of your bonds fall due. The 
security is the "Bank and its profits." If 'it is not rechartered, there is no 
Bank and no profits. The idea of your respected firm seems to be, that this 
"sacrifice" may be successfully opposed'\n the Courts of the State or of the 
United States. If that is the idea, it is altogether an error. 
No Court can make the State a party:__no decree can reach her-and she is 
not amenalole in any tribunals but her own Legislature, and the public opir,ion 
of the people. To attempt, therefore, any measures of redress, in or through 
a Court, either of the State or the United States, would end in a failure, and 
only serve to irritate and prejudice the State against you. 
And here the nature and value of this security may be considered. The 
value of the security is measured not only by the extent of the fund pledged, 
but by its nature, illustrated in tho fact, that while you could not sue a State 
in case of default, you would have a perfect right to sue tho Bank, and, upon 
obtaining judgment, to enforce it by execution. Now, if the State withdraws 
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the Bank, you have lost tbis remedy-and that you and Gen. l\lcDuJlie can-
vassed and gave full weight to these considerations he bears witness, in reply 
to certain inquirie3 which I addressed to him in November, 1843, which you 
will find in the volume I send herewith, at page 573. 
The true course, it appears to me, is the one I indicated heretofore-the case 
appears to me to be one of plain obligation on the part of the State, and if 
insisted on by the other party in the contract, cannot be disregarded. It is 
very true, as contended by some amongst us, that when you made that contract 
with Gen. McDuffie, you knew the charter of the Bank would expire in 1856, 
two years before the first, and twelve years before the last, repayment of the 
loan. But it was also seen by the Fire Loan Act, that the Bank and its pro-
fits were pledged until 1868; and you knew that those who made that pledge 
were fully authorized to extend the charter and make the security good in 
form, as they offered it in substance, by extending the charter. And when 
they authorized the offer, and Gen. McDuffie appeared as their agent in Lim-
<lon, with the Act in his hand, and thu commission of the State, under its broad 
seal, you were fully justified in making a contract, based on the understanding 
and faith of the St.ate, that the Bank would be continued, and it~ capital and 
profits held solemnly bound for the loan until its final redemption in 1868. 
HaYing full power and ability to make good all the Legislature offered in 
the Fire Loan Act, and all that the agent of the State, Gen. l\IcDuff1e, bound 
her for in the contract, there is no excuse for refusing to do so, if you insist 
upon it. 
That you may have all the documents wbich we have published before you, 
and see in what manner this point has been treated before our Legislature, I 
send you a copy of our Bank Compilation. The Fire Loan Act is at page 40, 
and Special Reports at pages 565, 6, and 651. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
F. H. ELMORE, President . 
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